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Social performance considered within the global performance of 
Microfinance institutions: a new approach 
 
Abstract 
In last years, microfinance has been seen as an effective measure for empowering whole nations 
or marginalized groups. However, some negative issues especially with respect to over-
indebtedness and high interest rates have been discussed as well. In fact, the performance of 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) has traditionally been measured by ratios. Thus, it should be 
remembered that MFIs are special socially-oriented financial organizations, mainly interested in 
the economic development of both rural and urban areas, in creating jobs, incorporating women 
into the labour market and addressing environmental concerns. The activity and performance 
ratios of these organizations are usually based on a single criterion, generally related to financial 
aspects or the extent of their outreach, in such a way that the performance measurement can vary 
according to the criterion selected. This paper proposes a new approach, a multicriteria method 
based on goal programming that considers not only financial aspects and outreach, but also the 
social performance related to the activities of a group of MFIs in Ecuador. Our study shows the 
weight of the Social Performance dimension on the rankings compared with other dimensions. 
The practical significance of these results lies in that now it is possible to present a more 
comprehensive picture of the performance of MFIs. Besides, the methodology chosen can shed 
some light on the mission drift debate.  
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In recent years it has been shown that people from the less privileged social strata may well have 
promising and feasible investment ideas that could materialize as profitable and successful 
businesses (Hollis and Sweetman, 1998).  
However, inadequate access to credit by the less privileged has been identified as one of the main 
contributing factors to poverty (Akpalu et al. 2012). This has given rise to the so-called 
“microcredit” phenomenon, consisting of granting small loans to poor workers to enable them to 
develop their projects independently. These small loans are granted by a new type of financial 
organization, in many cases Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), known as Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs). These organizations are in close contact with the local community and so can 
easily obtain information on those who apply for a loan. Da Silva (2007) states that before the 
creation of MFIs, bank loans were unavailable for poor people, and money lenders exploited many 
of the underbanked, especially in developing countries. In fact, although microfinance is often 
thought of as a tool to address poverty in developing countries, it is also being introduced in a 
number of countries in the developed world in order to address vulnerable groups (Barinaga, 
2014). Thus, from the developing countries to the developed ones, microfinance is promoted as a 
key intervention for improving the lives of socio-economically vulnerable individuals (Rogaly, 
1996). 
Furthermore, these institutions are not solely dedicated to making a profit but are also interested 
in other aspects, such as developing local industries in rural and urban areas, creating jobs, 
promoting sexual equality, incorporating women into the labour market and in caring for the 
environment. Currently, microfinance facilitates financial inclusion and linkage (Ashta, 2009) 
and expands financing channels for vulnerable groups such as the less privileged.  
Jonker (2009) defines microfinance as an economic innovation that has the goal to fight poverty. 
The most innovative aspect of the microfinance institutions is their peer group loan methodology, 
by which members jointly accept liability for the loans granted to the individuals in the group. 




































































as: dynamic incentives, regular payments plans and collateral substitutes (Morduch, 1999). 
Another advantage of the system is that it strengthens the labour market and encourages enterprise 
in developing countries, especially among women in rural areas (Weber and Ahmad, 2014).  
However, even though these organizations operate in a different way to traditional banks, it does 
not mean that they are not interested in other aspects, such as profits and/or efficiency. In fact, as 
Morduch (1999) has pointed out, when microcredit operations are analyzed very little 
consideration is given to the financial aspects and most of the attention is put on their 
sustainability and outreach (Yaron, 1994).  
On the other hand, we can also differentiate between more profit-oriented MFIs (banks, non-bank 
financial institutions and cooperatives) and less profit-oriented MFIs, often constituted by NGOs. 
Barry and Tacneng (2014) found that NGOs socially perform better than other MFI organizational 
forms and that they are best conduits of Microfinance. Some literature (Hermes et al. 2011; Hoque 
et al. 2011) suggests that poverty alleviation practitioners are starting to grapple with the rise 
(both structurally and ideologically) of increased commercial banking in Microfinance. In other 
words, the very same commercial financial institutions that had earlier avoided poverty lending 
are starting to push and displace the microfinance field’s foundational poverty alleviation and 
development principles over time. 
In this line of thought, the evolution and expansion of MFIs have given rise to a series of 
informative indicators, many of which are standardized. Thus, in 2003, a consensus group formed 
by microfinance rating agencies, donors, multilateral banks and private voluntary organizations 
reached an agreement on the standards to be used in defining financial terminology, ratios, and 
their adaptation to microfinancing. The criteria were divided into four categories: 
sustainability/profitability, management of assets/debts, portfolio quality and 
efficiency/productivity (CGAP, 2003). Since then, numerous studies have been published on the 
first three aspects (Ahlin et al. 2011), although not a lot has been published on the 
efficiency/productivity of these institutions (Cervelló et al. 2015; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. 2007; 




































































However, there is not a great deal of consensus as regards MFI social outreach indicators; on the 
contrary, different proposals have been made in the literature for measuring their performance in 
achieving their social objectives. The most commonly used is average loan size; some authors 
support the thesis that increased loan size means that the MFI abandon their poorer clients, or that 
they only stay with them if they are successful in business, in which case they are now not so poor 
(Mersland and Strom, 2010), thus weakening the social role of the MFIs. Hence, smaller loan 
sizes imply the greater social commitment of these institutions. The number of loans granted to 
women or to rural clients has also been used to measure the MFIs’ social role. In fact, development 
communities have placed great emphasis on microfinance hoping that it may reduce poverty and 
advance women’s empowerment in rural areas (Weber and Ahmad, 2014). As Islam et al. (2015) 
state an increasing proportion of the rural poor in many developing countries receive credit from 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). Hartaska et al. (2013) estimated that microfinance served more 
than 150 million borrowers. Most MFIs, especially the donor driven ones, usually target female 
borrowers who are believed to give high priority to basic needs such as health services, education, 
water and infrastructure and, therefore, are seen as important agents in the fight against poverty, 
especially in rural areas. 
Some of these studies emphasize the fact that women find it harder to escape from poverty than 
men, so that microfinancing is seen as playing a crucial role in their emancipation. Also, women 
contribute to relieving poverty by giving priority to maintaining and improving the family’s 
standard of living. Thus, increasing the women’s access to microfinance could be a major 
contributing factor to increasing efficiency in output. For these reasons, generic indicators are 
included in the social objectives.  
Some authors point to other aspects of microfinancing in rural areas (González-Vega, 2003; 
Christen and Rosenberg, 2006), while others deal with the particular cases of individual 
institutions or countries (Derflinger et al. 2006). Other works describe the application of certain 
specific risk-management tools, such as Barnett and Mahul (2007) or Skees and Barnett (2006). 
In general, the literature makes clear that the outreach of microfinance institutions is less advanced 




































































reasons given for this situation include: geographical location or the characteristics of agricultural 
production, the additional costs involved in operating in rural areas, the smaller number of 
financial products adapted to the needs of agricultural firms, or the concentration of risks due to 
the special production systems of these firms (González-Vega, 2003). For all these reasons, there 
is still an unsatisfied demand for investment funds from small agricultural producers or firms in 
rural areas. Recent estimates (Dalberg, 2012) indicate that both state and MFI loans jointly cover 
less than 2% of the potential demand for finance from these small producers. This means that 
microfinancing in rural areas still represents a challenge for MFIs, as their operations in these 
areas cannot be guaranteed to bring in profits. 
Specifically, the trade-off between social goals and making a profit alludes to the concept of 
mission drift, which has emerged in recent years after the studies published by Copestake (2007) 
and Jones (2007), who considered the dilemma between profits and the social objectives which 
were initially considered to be the raison-d’etre of these organizations. In particular, Copestake 
(2007) suggested that greater integration with mainstream banking could imply greater emphasis 
on profits, efficiency and portfolio quality, at the expense of development and social goals, and 
from this viewpoint constructs a comprehensive amplified model to define the concept of mission 
drift. 
In relation to this debate, a number of studies have attempted to empirically verify the existence 
of mission drift, e.g. Copestake (2007), Mersland and Strom (2010), Hermes et al. (2011), who, 
although they did find some cases of the phenomenon, also found that it was not widespread. 
Some authors believe that financial and social objectives should be able to exist together; 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2007) propose a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model to measure the 
financial and social efficiency of MFIs. In this vein, the purpose of this paper is to introduce an 
alternative methodology that allows considering social and financial goals when assessing the 
MFIs' performance. The methodological approach consists of a multiple criteria programming 
model and optimization method in which the solutions reduce the degree of non-compliance of 




































































Section 2 describes the method in depth, emphasizing its utility, and specifies the data sources 
used to arrive at a global performance assessment. Section 3 examines the results obtained by 
applying the method to a sample of MFIs operating in Ecuador in South America. The final 
section contains the main conclusions obtained in the study. 
2. Methodology  
2.1 The Goal Programming model 
As mentioned above, a series of generally accepted indicators has been defined to allow 
comparable information to be obtained on different MFIs. They can also be used to order these 
institutions and there are numerous rankings that order MFIs in a given region according to total 
assets, volume of business, number of employees, etc. This approach to ordering by a single 
criterion or variable has a serious drawback, as focusing on a single variable provides no 
information on the other variables or on the overall position of a given entity within a reference 
group or comparison sector. 
This paper therefore proposes to use a multicriteria ranking in an attempt to synthesize in a single 
index all the information obtained from different single-criterion rankings. As a novelty, we will 
also include in the multicriteria models the social and rural development aspects, together with 
the classic financial criteria mentioned above. This is done to obtain the trade-off between the 
social and financial objectives that has given rise to the mission-drift concept. 
Various studies exist which use mathematical programming to study sustainability and 
development aspects in rural areas (Brandon et al. 2005). One of these proposed methods is known 
as CRITIC (Criteria Importance Through Intercriteria Correlation) (Diakoulakis et al. 1995). In 
this case, the importance of the criteria is considered in proportion to the singularity of the 
information they provide, so that the less a criterion overlaps with another, the higher its weighting 
will be. Another option is to use a modified version of TOPSIS (Technique for Order Preference 
by Similarity to Ideal Solution) (Deng et al. 2006) using Euclidean distances together with a 




































































goal programming technique (Charnes et al. 1955). A review of recent literature that uses this 
technique and includes socially responsible elements can be found in Ballestero et al. (2015). In 
the present work we propose the use of the goal programming technique presented by García et 
al. (2010a, 2010b) and García-Martínez et al. (2017) to obtain global performance. 
Goal programming (Charnes et al., 1955) is a well known multicriteria technique consisting of 
both linear and non-linear functions and continuous or discrete variables in which all the functions 
have been transformed into objectives or goals (Ignizio and Romero, 2003; Prišenk et al. 2014). 
Unlike the optimization concept imposed by the mathematical models with a single objective 
function, goal programming can be interpreted under the philosophy of satisfaction, in the sense 
that from this point of view the decision-maker wants to minimize the non-achievement of his 
goals (Romero, 2001), since the simultaneous satisfaction of all the goals is rarely feasible. 
The present study proposes combining the different rankings by means of different goal 
programming models (García et al. 2010a, 2010b; García-Martínez et al. 2017). According to the 
standard used, the solution obtained can be interpreted either as a solution in which there is 
maximum consensus between the measurements (penalizing the most conflictive as against those 
that follow the general trend), or as a solution in which the most conflicting measurements are 
given higher preference (penalizing those that share most information with the rest). In the first 
case, the absolute difference between the multicriteria value and the standardized value of the 
single criterion (norm 𝐿1) is minimal. In the second, the greater difference between the 
multicriteria value and the standardized single-criterion value (norm 𝐿∞) is minimal. 
The norm 𝐿1 goal programming model appears in (1): 
 







∑ (𝑤𝑘𝑣𝑖𝑘)𝑐𝑘=1 + 𝑛𝑖𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛   𝑗 = 1 … 𝑐 




































































∑ (𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗)𝑐𝑗=1 = 𝑉𝑖 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛 
∑ (𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗)𝑛𝑖=1 = 𝐷𝑗 𝑗 = 1 … 𝑐 
∑ 𝐷𝑗𝑐𝑗=1 = 𝑍   (1) 
 
where: 
𝑤𝑗 = weight to be estimated for the jth criterion.  
𝑛𝑖𝑗(𝑝𝑖𝑗) = negative (positive) deviation variable that quantifies the difference by excess (defect) 
between the value of the ith MFI in the jth criterion and the multicriteria value obtained by applying 
the weights 𝑤𝑗. Which is: 𝑛𝑖𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑣𝑖𝑗 − ∑ (𝑤𝑘𝑣𝑖𝑘)𝑐𝑘=1 , con 𝑛𝑖𝑗, 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0. 
The objective function of (1) ensures that only one of the deviation variables can have a value 
greater than zero: 𝑛𝑖𝑗 × 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 0. 
𝐷𝑗 = degree of disagreement between the jth criterion and the multicriteria value. 
𝑍 = magnitude of overall disagreement. 
 
The model (1) has a total of 𝑛 × 𝑐 goal constraints. This means that for each criterion j (j=1…c) 
the model implements n constraints, one for each alternative i (i=1…n) and must determine the 
weight associated with criterion j, 𝑤𝑗. This is done by minimizing the difference in absolute terms 
between the performance of the single criterion of each alternative in criterion j, 𝑣𝑖𝑗, and the 
multicriteria performance 𝑉𝑖, with 𝑉𝑖 = ∑ (𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗)𝑐𝑗=1 . This value is the ultimate goal of the 
method, since on assigning a single value to each alternative as the total of all the single-criterion 
performances, the ranking of the alternatives is obtained immediately. 
The value of the objective function provides the degree of non-achievement of the set of goals. 
The sum of all the weights is restricted to 1. The last constraints are used to compute the 
multicriteria performance of the MFIs (𝑉𝑖), the degree of disagreement of each single-criterion 
measure with respect to the multicriteria value (𝐷𝑗) and the degree of overall disagreement (𝑍). 




































































weighted goal programming model (WGP) (Ballestero and García-Bernabeu, 2012; Romero, 
2014). 
The 𝐿∞ norm is implemented by the MINMAX (2) goal programming model, in which 𝐷 
represents the maximum deviation between the multicriteria value and the single-criterion values. 




∑ (𝑤𝑘𝑣𝑖𝑘)𝑐𝑘=1 + 𝑛𝑖𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛   𝑗 = 1 … 𝑐 
∑ (𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗)𝑛𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐷 𝑗 = 1 … 𝑐 
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑐𝑗=1 = 1  
∑ (𝑤𝑗𝑐)𝑐𝑗=1 = 𝑉𝑖 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛 
∑ (𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗)𝑛𝑖=1 = 𝐷𝑗 𝑗 = 1 … 𝑐 
∑ 𝐷𝑗𝑐𝑗=1 = 𝑍   (2) 
 
The performance of alternative i in criterion j (𝑣𝑖𝑗) is normalized from the original variable (𝑢𝑖𝑗), 
so that 𝑣𝑖𝑗 = (𝑢𝑖𝑗 − 𝑢∗𝑗) (𝑢𝑗∗ − 𝑢∗𝑗)⁄ , with 𝑢𝑗∗ = max𝑖 𝑢𝑖𝑗 and 𝑢∗𝑗 = min𝑖 𝑢𝑖𝑗. Normalization is 
necessary when the original variables are given in different magnitudes (e.g. monetary units, 
numbers of people, percentages, etc.). The solutions provided by models (1) and (2) represent 
extreme cases: favouring global consensus (WGP) or favouring the criterion that generates 
rankings with a high degree of idiosyncracy (MINIMAX GP). 
As a compromise between (1) and (2) is the Extended Goal Programming model (3) in which the 
parameter 𝜆 provides more balanced solutions (González-Pachón and Romero, 1999; Linares and 
Romero, 2002). This extends the range of possibilities when deciding which multicriteria value 
is the most appropriate and representative of the individual criteria. It should be emphasized that 











































































+ (1 − 𝜆)𝐷 
𝑠. 𝑡. 
∑ (𝑤𝑘𝑣𝑖𝑘)𝑐𝑘=1 + 𝑛𝑖𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛   𝑗 = 1 … 𝑐 
∑ (𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗)𝑛𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐷 𝑗 = 1 … 𝑐 
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑐𝑗=1 = 1  
∑ (𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗)𝑐𝑗=1 = 𝑉𝑖 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛 
∑ (𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗)𝑛𝑖=1 = 𝐷𝑗 𝑗 = 1 … 𝑐 
∑ 𝐷𝑗𝑐𝑗=1 = 𝑍   (3) 
 
2.2 Other methodologies for ranking alternatives 
In this section, we compare the proposed goal programming model with other well-known 
multicriteria methodologies which are used in the ranking of alternatives. 
In fact, many of these methodologies were not initially proposed for the ranking of alternatives. 
In some cases, their original purpose was to determine the weights of criteria; however, this 
indirectly entails the performance of a ranking of alternatives. 
Among the proposed methodologies which allow estimating the relative weights of the criteria, 
we can differentiate between objective methods and subjective methods. As Wierzbicki (2010) 
points out, the classical approach in multicriteria decision focuses on subjective rankings. This 
statement is based on the fact that human decisions are based on personal experience, memory, 




































































Among the methods that allow to organize the criteria in a hierarchy based on the decision maker's 
judgment and to infer a ranking of the alternatives, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1980) 
is one of the most spread subjective methods1. 
Opposite to the approach of subjective methods, some management decisions are made 
individually by decision makers and affect many people. In these cases the decision maker wants 
to have a computerized decision support and rational ranking, and does not want to use personal 
preferences and subjective judgments. That is to say, he prefers to make decisions under the 
premise that his action will be justified to others by the use of an objective tool; thus, no one can 
doubt their honesty and impartiality. Wierzbicki (2010) puts as an example the companies that 
contract with third companies to asses them on issues that can be crucial for their development. 
For example, when a CEO prioritize several investment options he might make a decision based 
on his own intuition. However, he could prefer to have the external and independent advice of 
another consulting firm, which would allow him to justify its decision when reporting the 
management committee, his partners and shareholders. 
Full objectivity is not attainable, but in many situations we try to be as much objective as possible. 
As pointed out by some researchers, a deficiency of the subjective methods is that the weights of 
criteria may change depending on who the decision maker is. Therefore, different decision makers 
can assign different weights to the criteria and, as a consequence, the ranking of the alternatives 
can be seriously affected. The objective methods try to overcome this drawback. 
Among the objective methods for the ranking of alternatives we can highlight the CRITIC method 
(Diakoulaki et al., 1995), TOPSIS (Deng et al., 2000), and even DEA through super efficiency 
(Charnes et al., 1978), despite the aim of DEA is not to rank the companies. 
CRITIC is based on the idea that information contained in multicriteria decision-making problems 
is related to both contrast intensity and conflict of the decision criteria. According to Diakoulaki 
et al. (2000) a multicriteria problem in which the alternatives in all evaluation criteria are in 
                                                     
1 Regarding subjectivity, we refer to the explicit consideration of the judgments made by the 
decision maker and not to the mathematical procedure that is used to compute the relative weight 




































































complete concordance, does not present any interest because the choice is evident. The 
introduction of a new criterion providing a different ranking of the alternatives adds new 
information and alters the decision situation. In addition, the notion of conflict is of primary 
importance in firm comparisons, since many financial ratios are often highly correlated. 
The importance of the 𝑗-th criteria, 𝐶𝑗, is obtained through equation (4), where the intensity of 
each criterion 𝑗 is computed as its standard deviation 𝜎𝑗. The conflict is measured by 
∑ (1 − 𝑟𝑗𝑘)𝑐𝑘=1 , where 𝑟𝑗𝑘 is the correlation coefficient between 𝑗 and 𝑘 criteria. 
𝐶𝑗 = 𝜎𝑗 ∑ (1 − 𝑟𝑗𝑘)𝑐𝑘=1    (4) 
Deng et al. (2000) propose a modified version of TOPSIS using weighted Euclidean distances 
combined with an entropy measure for calculating the weights. The amount of decision 
information emitted from each criterion is measured by 𝑒𝑗: 
𝑒𝑗 = −𝑘 ∑ (𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑗)𝑛𝑖=1    (5) 
where 𝑘 = 1 𝑙𝑛(𝑛)⁄  and the weight of each criterion is calculated proportionally to (6): 
𝑑𝑗 = 1 − 𝑒𝑗   (6) 
Therefore, in both cases it is considered that the greater the variability of the criterion, the greater 
the weight this criterion will have in the ranking. However, the modified version of TOPSIS does 
not take into account that some criteria may be partially or fully redundant, since they might be 
highly correlated and form part of the same dimension. 
CRITIC and the model proposed in our work take into account this circumstance. However, as 
shown by García et al. (2010a) the solutions obtained by goal programming dominate those 
generated by CRITIC in the space considered by the authors. The goal programming model could 
obtain the optimal Pareto frontier of solutions, where other multicriteria models obtain a single 
solution. However, goal programming does not guarantee a Pareto optimal solution. In fact, goal 
programming was not designed with the purpose of obtaining non-dominated solutions but was 
developed as a method for finding satisficing solutions (Romero, 2014). If the intention of the 
decision maker is to achieve at least the goals’ target values, then an optimal solution can be a 




































































an optimal solution could simply satisfy this goal in a strict way. But an alternative optimal 
solution could achieve 1,200 active borrowers. Both solutions can be optimal, but the first one is 
non-efficient. In the case of model (3) both negative and positive deviations along with the 
maximum deviation are minimized in the objective function. This model is not intended to assure 
a minimum value in any specific goal; on the contrary, the multicriteria performance is designed 
to better approximate the single-criterion values. 
With all this, a common drawback of these methods is that the linear aggregation of preferences 
expressed by the weighted sum tends to promote decisions with unbalanced criteria, as illustrated 
by the Korhonen paradox. In order to accommodate the natural human preference for balanced 
solutions, a nonlinear aggregation is necessary (Wierzbicki, 2010). 
In addition to the multi-criteria approach, some authors point out some measures of concentration 
to adequately capture the dispersion of some variables (Lozza et al., 2013). Among the measures 
considered may be the Lorenz curve or the Gini index. 
The Lorenz curve has been applied on economics as a graphical representation of the distribution 
of wealth (or income), and shows the proportion of wealth assumed by a percentage of the 
population. An equal wealth distribution where every person has the same wealth would be 
represented as a straight line. An unequal distribution would exhibit a curve. 
The Gini coefficient also measures inequalities in a frequency distribution. A value of zero means 
perfect equality, where all wealth values are the same. A value of one means maximal inequality 
among the wealth values of the population. 
So both Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient could be used to measure the dispersion of the wealth. 
In our problem, they could be used to measure how similar or dissimilar are the criteria. In this 
sense, we could think about these approaches in the same way on how partial correlations are 
used to measure the degree of association between two criteria, when the effect of other criteria 








































































As already mentioned, the variables used in the works cited in the preceding section were 
considered when selecting the variables for this study. Special attention was paid to mean loan 
size, the variables linked to the rural environment and those that encouraged women to enter the 
labour market, together with others linked to financial performance, outreach and the 
characteristics of the MFIs themselves. The following performance dimensions and their most 
representative variables were thus considered: Institutional Characteristics (IC), Outreach (OU), 
Overall Financial Performance (OFP) and Social Performance (SP). As is normal in studies on 
performance, certain areas were assigned different variables referring to different aspects. Table 
1 shows these variables together with the global performance dimensions, or the categories in 
which they are found and therefore represent. 
All the criteria are directly combined in the global performance ranking, assuming that the greater 
the value of one of the criteria, the greater the perception of performance, with the exception of 
the average loan balance per borrower (ALBPB), in which, in view of the above-cited definition 
of mission drift, it was considered that the lower the value the higher the performance (“the less 
is better”), since it allowed a higher number of borrowers to be included and thus gave a larger 
population easier access to finance, especially among the less privileged. The data base used in 
the study was obtained from data collected from MIX Market reports, published by Microfinance 
Information Exchange (2012), a global web-based microfinance information platform and the 
main source of social and financial performance data relating to MFIs. 
Information was collected for the 33 MFIs operating in Ecuador with data available at the MIX 
Market reports, in relation to the above-mentioned variables for the year 2012. 
3. Results  
3.1 Global Performance 
The original variables having been normalized, the variables shown in Table 1 are used as the 




































































relative importance of the individual criteria in the global performance ranking, and secondly the 
multicriteria value that places the MFI in the ranking according to global performance. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 shows the results obtained according to the values assigned to the λ parameter. For each 
of these values, we give the weights of each criterion, the deviation between multicriteria 
performance and each of the Dj (j = 1…12) criteria, maximum deviation D between criteria, and 
global deviation Z as the sum of all the Dj . 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
For λ=1 the model obtains non-null coefficients for all variables except A, P and %GRLP. The 
first two belong to the Institutional Characteristics dimension, which means they do not contribute 
to global activity/performance. However, the A variable does begin to have a certain influence on 
λ values between 0.6 and 0.1, both inclusive. It should be emphasized that NAB, ALBPB and 
GLP have a considerable influence, followed by %NARB, although the latter loses its influence 
after λ = 0.5, giving way to the other rural development indicator %GRLP. It can therefore be 
concluded that the Outreach and Social Performance dimensions are the best representatives of 
the general tendency of global activity/performance. In fact, when the weights of all the variables 
that represent these two dimensions (80.45% for OU and 18.92% for SP) are added together, a 
value of 99.37% is obtained, and the remaining 0.63% is explained by the only measure of Overall 
Financial Performance, the Return on Equity (ROE) variable.  
It can be seen that as the value of λ drops, the number of variables involved in calculating global 
activity/performance stays the same, except for λ=0.9, λ=0.3 and λ=0.2, in which the number is 
reduced to five. For the λ=0 extreme, only three variables have non-null coefficients: GLP (that 
belongs to OU), %GRLP and %FB (that belong to Social Performance). This confirms that these 




































































performance. In fact, neither Overall Financial Performance nor the variables linked to active 
borrowers have any influence whatsoever, in spite of being decisive in the λ = 1 model. 
Also, it can be seen that for the Dj values of the variables, in almost all cases D6 and D7 have the 
highest values, followed by D9 for the different values of λ and, in most cases, coincide with the 
highest deviation D. This means that %NARB and %GRLP are the variables most in disagreement 
with the other single-criteria that measure global performance, followed by %FB. In other words, 
the percentage of total active borrowers in rural areas, the percentage of the global portfolio 
assigned to these areas, and the percentage of women borrowers are the variables that agree least 
with the consensus of the other variables. This is of great interest, since all three variables are 
included in the Social Performance dimension and therefore confirm the existence of an incentive 
to mission drift by the MFIs, so that, on being concentrated in these social goals, the other 
variables give a reduced perception of performance. 
The bottom rows in Table 2 give the weights of each of the dimensions in the analysis, obtained 
as the sum of the weights of each criterion. It can be clearly seen that as the value of λ is reduced, 
the Outreach and Overall Financial Performance dimensions concede part of their weight to Social 
Performance and occasionally to Institutional Characteristics. It can thus be seen that for the 
smallest λ values the influence of the weight of the Social Performance dimension is higher than 
50%. 
In spite of the fact that the weight of each criterion, or of the set of criteria calculated for the 
dimension, offers an idea of the relative importance of each measure in calculating global 
performance, with the aim of verifying the existence of mission drift in the global performance 
of the MFIs we carried out a Spearman’s correlation analysis in order to study the correlation 
between the individual measures of each criterion and the global performance of the MFIs 
included in the study. These correlation levels are given in Table 3. It can be seen that the variables 
with the highest degree of correlation are %GRLP, with values between 0.208 (λ= 0.5) and 0.808 
(λ= 0.3) and %NARB, with values between 0.196 (λ= 0.5) and 0.763 (λ= 0.3). Overall, it can be 
stated that on favouring the maximum consensus between the measures (penalizing the most 




































































that the highest correlations are for Outreach and Institutional Characteristics, although some 
social variables also show a certain positive correlation. On the other hand, on searching for a 
solution in which the most conflictive measures are given greater preference (lower λvalues) the 
rural variables show the highest correlation. Then, we could say that in general terms there is no 
conflict between global performance and social indicators, letting little room to the appearance of 
mission drift. Besides, it should be pointed out that both ROE and ALBPB hardly show one 
significant correlation throughout the entire range of the analysis, which raises questions on their 
validity as measures of global performance. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
3.2 Ranking of Ecuadorian microfinance institutes 
Bearing in mind the need to not only analyze the ranking on the basis of final performance, but 
also on the decisive role of this type of result on decision-making processes, the different MFI 
rankings obtained by the model were also analysed. 
Of the Ecuadorian MFIs analyzed, those that obtained the best positions were: Banco Solidario, 
COAC Jardín Azuayo and Fundación Espoir, in the first quartile for all values of λ; those with 
the lowest positions in the ranking were: COAC Artesanos, COAC Chone, COAC Luz del Valle 
and FUNDAMIC, which were always positioned in the last and/or third quartile. 
As regards dispersion, four MFIs were always found together in the same quartile: Banco 
Solidario, COAC Jardín Azuayo and Fundación Espoir (first quartile) and COAC Kullki Wasi 
(second quartile). It is also interesting to note that only one, FINCA-ECU, occupied positions in 
all the quartiles, and that in more than 50% of the results the 33 MFIs occupied the same position, 
which indicates the robustness of the results (see Table 4). 
 






































































The performance of MFIs has traditionally been measured by means of ratios. However, this 
approach cannot detect any possible conflict between social and financial goals, also known as 
the mission drift concept. Unlike activity and performance rankings based on a single criterion, 
the goal programming multicriteria method proposed in this paper provides an estimate of the 
performance of an MFI, by simultaneously combining individual criteria linked not only to 
financial and outreach dimensions, but also to the Social Performance dimension. In particular, 
literature considers within such dimension the economic development of rural areas, the 
incorporation of women into the labour market and the granting of small loans to the less 
privileged as part of the social goals. Hence, we add these indicators in the estimates. The 
proposed method was used to obtain the multicriteria ranking of a sample of MFIs at present 
operating in Ecuador. 
The goal programming technique was used to calculate weights considering the existing 
similarities between the values of different criteria and global performance, the latter value being 
finally used to measure the performance of the MFIs. By applying different versions of the goal 
programming model, a collective approach was used (in which higher weights were given to 
criteria with similar results and lower weights to the more heterogeneous), as well as an individual 
approach (higher weights to the most heterogeneous). Moreover, as a compromise solution 
between both approaches, a parametric version was developed with the aim of widening the range 
of possibilities open to decision makers, in such a way that the previous approaches were 
converted into particular cases of the third approach. 
The results for the sample show that, for every value of the weight parameter chosen, certain MFIs 
are always found in the first positions, while others are always placed in the last. From this we 
can conclude that there are two clear groups of Ecuadorian MFIs which perform better and worse 
than the average, regardless of the measure of performance chosen.  
Therefore, the good or bad performance does not seem to be affected by the focus on social or 




































































Nevertheless, the correlation analysis carried out confirms this finding on the mission drift, while 
simultaneously giving a slightly more nuanced picture on this respect. Rural lending indicators 
chosen are found to have a certain correlation with global performance at every parameter level, 
therefore the focus on rural lending seems to allow MFIs to achieve good results in the usual 
performance dimensions. To a lesser degree, the focus on the female borrowers follows the same 
direction. On the other hand, the most commonly used indicator of social performance -the 
average loan per borrower- neither follows nor goes in conflict with the usual performance 
dimensions. 
Furthermore, the weight of the variables of the Social Performance dimension have a considerable 
influence on the rankings, as this weight increases as singular criteria are sought. In view of the 
results obtained, it can be concluded that an increase in the portfolio of loans granted to borrowers 
in rural areas, in the number of active borrowers in rural areas, and in the percentage of women 
borrowers would give a better global performance to each of the MFIs. 
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Assets (A) Institutional Characteristics (IC) 
Personnel (P) Institutional Characteristics (IC) 
Number of Active Borrowers (NAB) Outreach (OU) 
Gross Loan Portfolio (GLP) Outreach (OU) 
Return on Equity (ROE) Overall Financial Performance (OFP) 
% Number of active rural borrowers (%NARB)  Social Performance (SP) 
% Gross rural loan portfolio (%GRLP) Social Performance (SP) 
Average loan balance per borrower (ALBPB)* Social Performance (SP) 
% Number of Female Borrowers (%FB) Social Performance (SP) 
 






Numerical results according to value of parameter O  
 
Weights  A P NAB GLP ROE %NARB %GRLP ALBPB %FB 
λ 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.5267 0.2778 0.0063 0.0885 0.0000 0.5080 0.0050 
 0.9 0.0000 0.0000 0.4505 0.2967 0.0000 0.1409 0.0000 0.0599 0.0521 
 0.8 0.0000 0.0000 0.4236 0.2830 0.0012 0.1463 0.0000 0.0953 0.0506 
 0.7 0.0000 0.0000 0.4272 0.2765 0.0061 0.1459 0.0000 0.0988 0.0454 
 0.6 0.0579 0.0000 0.4611 0.1372 0.0000 0.2092 0.0000 0.0852 0.0495 
 0.5 0.0000 0.0000 0.5087 0.1024 0.0380 0.0960 0.2031 0.0517 0.0000 
 0.4 0.0192 0.0000 0.4222 0.1011 0.0496 0.0000 0.3521 0.0558 0.0000 
 0.3 0.1091 0.0000 0.3454 0.0000 0.0813 0.0000 0.3950 0.0693 0.000 
 0.2 0.1091 0.0000 0.3454 0.0000 00813 0.0000 0.3950 0.0693 0.0000 
 0.1 0.2802 0.0000 0.1879 0.0000 0.0141 0.0000 0.4153 0.0206 0.0819 
 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4517 0.0000 0.0000 0.3976 0.0000 0.1507 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 2 (continuation) 
Numerical results according to value of parameter O  
Distances  D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 Z 
O  1 13.3836 3.7073 2.9344 2.6123 3.8403 10.3602 13.3836 12.9061 5.7424 10.7796 66.2663 
 0.9 12.5983 4.3732 3.6897 3.4044 4.5062 9.6090 12.5983 12.1229 5.8136 10.2505 66.3678 
 0.8 12.3670 4.6843 3.9587 3.6110 4.8173 9.4150 12.3670 11.9075 5.6148 10.0300 66.4057 
 0.7 12.3478 4.7006 3.9763 3.6206 4.8336 9.40239 12.3470 11.8927 5.6089 10.0340 66.4167 
 0.6 11.4374 5.6432 4.8959 4.3058 5.7762 8.7706 11.4374 10.9890 5.6979 9.4717 66.9878 
 0.5 10.3004 6.5518 5.9787 5.1809 6.6808 8.0039 10.3004 9.8355 6.2931 9.1975 68.0221 
 0.4 9.4312 7.3701 6.8420 6.0567 7.4298 7.6477 9.4312 8.9751 6.5469 8.8791 69.1092 
 0.3 8.4215 8.3061 7.8798 7.1132 8.4215 7.3173 8.4215 8.0210 6.9886 8.4215 70.8903 
 0.2 8.4215 8.3061 7.8798 7.1132 8.4215 7.31731 8.4215 8.0210 6.9886 8.4215 70.8903 
 0.1 8.3309 8.2284 7.8962 7.4342 8.33097 7.6641 8.3309 7.94415 7.2793 8.3309 71.4391 
 0 8.2637 8.2637 7.9956 7.9144 82637 8.2637 8.2637 8.2637 7.6355 8.2637 73.1274 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 2 (continuation) 
Numerical results according to value of parameter O  
Dimensions  IC OU OFP SP 
O  1 0.0000 0.8045 0.0063 0.1892 
 0.9 0.0000 0.7471 0.0000 0.2529 
 0.8 0.0000 0.7066 0.0012 0.2922 
 0.7 0.0000 0.7037 0.0061 0.2902 
 0.6 0.0579 0.5983 0.0000 0.3438 
 0.5 0.0000 0.6111 0.0380 0.3509 
 0.4 0.0192 0.5233 0.0496 0.4079 
 0.3 0.1091 0.3454 0.0813 0.4643 
 0.2 0.1091 0.3454 0.0813 0.4643 
 0.1 0.2802 0.1879 0.0141 0.5178 
 0 0.0000 0.4517 0.0000 0.5483 





Spearman’s correlation coefficient 
  A P NAB GLP ROE %NARB %GRLP ALBPB %FB 
λ 1 0.588 0.524 0.668 0.591 0.055 0.354 0.368 -0.002 0.124 
 
0.9 0.503 0.450 0.575 0.508 -0.009 0.424 0.444 0.023 0.184 
 
0.8 0.407 0.496 0.638 0.418 0.050 0.297 0.311 -0.060 0.076 
 
0.7 0.442 0.387 0.528 0.444 -0.026 0.445 0.459 0.088 0.182 
 
0.6 0.373 0.307 0.452 0.374 0.013 0.527 0.550 0.121 0.213 
 
0.5 -0.229 -0.245 -0.142 -0.203 0.078 0.196 0.208 0.186 -0.025 
 
0.4 0.203 0.114 0.266 0.201 0.140 0.728 0.771 0.176 0.311 
 
0.3 0.112 0014 0.178 0.109 0.224 0.763 0.808 0.199 0.327 
 
0.2 0.112 0.014 0.178 0.109 0.224 0.763 0.808 0.199 0.327 
 
0.1 0.164 0.047 0.188 0.162 0.107 0.738 0.778 0.123 0.342 
 
0 0.210 0.077 0.195 0.211 0.098 0.687 0.730 0.011 0.276 





Position according to interquartile frequency 
Name  
1st 
quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
Banco Solidario 11       
CACMU 5 6   
CCC 2 6 3  
CEPESIU  3 7 1 
COAC 4 de Octubre  1 9 1 
COAC Ambato 1 4 6  
COAC Artesanos   1 10 
COAC Atuntaqui  4 7  
COAC Chone   1 10 
COAC Fernando Daquilema 10 1  
COAC Jardín Azuayo 11    
COAC Kullki Wasi  11   
COAC La Benéfica  1 6 4 
COAC Luz del Valle   1 10 
COAC Padre Vicente 1 9 1  
COAC San Antonio  1 6 4 
COAC San Gabriel   3 8 
COAC San José 7 4   
COAC Santa Anita   3 8 
CODESARROLLO  3 5 3 
COOPROGRESO 6 3 2  
FACES   2 9 
FINCA – ECU 4 1 5 1 
FODEMI 7 4   
Fundación Alternativa 7 4  
Fundación Espoir 11    
FUNDAMIC   1 10 
INSOTEC  6 5  
ProCredit - ECU 6 2 3  
UCADE Ambato 10 1   
UCADE Guaranda 10    
UCADE Latacunga 9 2   
UCADE Santo Domingo 4 7  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
